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In some sports leagues, the sports association sells broadcasting rights centrally in order to 
create competitive balance. In other ones, the market is decentral. As a result, there is 
competitive imbalance. In this paper, the preferred kind of marketing of sports associations is 
analysed. Distinctions are made between three cases. In case one, the sports association is 
only interested in competitive balance. In the second case, it wishes to create a single high 
performing team, and in the third, it maximises aggregate performance. It is found that, 
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1.  Introduction 
In some sports leagues, the respective sports association restricts the possible actions of the 
clubs in order to create a balanced team structure. An example of this is German Major 
League Soccer. In Germany, the soccer clubs are limited to central marketing by the German 
Soccer Association (DFB). With this central marketing, the DFB wishes to create a higher 
competitive balance. It distributes the TV revenues, resulting from the central marketing, 
more or less equally to the soccer clubs
1 so that they are all able to invest in the quality of 
their respective team.
2 
According to Szymanski (2003) there are three core claims justifying these interventions: 
1.  Inequality of resources leads to uneven competition. 
2.  Fan interest declines when outcomes become more predictable. 
3.  Specific redistribution mechanisms produce more outcome uncertainty.
3 
However, in other sports leagues the respective sports association does not intervene in order 
to increase the degree of homogeneity between the teams. In Italian or Spanish Major League 
Soccer, e.g., marketing is completely decentral. Consequently, the clubs have the possibility 
to sell the rights to broadcast their home matches on their own. Due to the fact that very 
successful teams attract more viewers, the TV stations pay high prices to televise the home 
matches of the famous teams, while the less famous teams receive substantially lower 
payments.
4 Since high payments entail the opportunity of increasing team quality, such 
decentral marketing leads to rather uneven teams. In the past, some small Italian soccer clubs 
                                                 
1 In Germany, 50% of the TV revenues are shared equally, while the other 50% are distributed based on 
performance. 
2 The central marketing only affects the allocation of TV revenues. In all other items, e.g. sponsoring, the clubs 
are allowed to market decentrally. Since TV revenues represent the main part of the clubs` incomes, an equal 
allocation of these revenues decreases the differences in the clubs` incomes in a significant way. 
3 In this paper, competitive balance and outcome uncertainty are used as synonyms. This is only for simplicity. 
In most team sports, the teams are more likely to win their home matches than their away matches. Therefore, 
total outcome uncertainty would be given if the away team was more able than the home team and not if the 
teams were equally able. See, e.g., Forrest and Simmons (2002) for a more detailed description of this item. 
4 In the season 2002/2003 the Italian soccer club Juventus Turin received a payment of about 60 Million Euro for 
its television rights, while smaller clubs like Atalanta Bergamo or Chievo Verona received a payment of less 
than 10 Million Euro.    3
went on strike several times to get higher TV revenues. These mainly unsuccessful strikes 
caused the cancellation of several days of play in Italian Major League Soccer. Clearly, the 
question arises of why the Italian Soccer Association (FIGC) does not also install an 
instrument like central marketing to intensify competition between clubs. 
An answer could be that competitive balance is not the only determinant of fan interest. For 
example, one could think that fans like to see top performances.
5 A team consisting of several 
superstars might play outstanding soccer that enthuses a great many spectators. Although such 
a team would be a clear favourite in the championships, i.e., there would be only little 
outcome uncertainty, fan attendance could still be very high. The fans might enjoy the great 
performance of the superstar team. However, if all national clubs receive similar payments, no 
club might have enough money to engage a couple of national or international superstars and, 
therefore, fan interest might be very small. In this case, a mechanism like the central 
marketing is very inappropriate.
6 
In soccer, there is a second reason why decentral marketing could be preferred by the 
association. The best teams of the European soccer leagues qualify for the “European 
Champions League”, a tournament arranged by the European Soccer Association (UEFA). A 
national soccer association might therefore be interested in creating several very strong teams, 
for these teams are more likely to be successful in the inter-country competition. Thus, the 
soccer association is not necessarily interested in creating competitive balance. It might well 
be interested in creating several high-performing teams or in maximising the aggregate 
quality of the league. 
Most of the related literature analyses empirically whether fan attendance increases in 
outcome uncertainty or not (see, e.g., Hart et al., 1975; Jennett, 1984; Peel and Thomas, 1988, 
                                                 
5 See for a more general discussion of the importance of absolute performance in the sports context Hoehn and 
Szymanski (1999). 
6 The point that fans are highly interested in outstanding performances is also of importance in other sports. In 
athletics, e.g., the organiser of a meeting tries to invite one or more outstanding teams (such as a relay) that 
might break a world record since fan enthusiasm in athletics significantly increases in the number of top 
performances.   4
1992, 1997; Forrest and Simmons 2002). Almost all papers support the hypothesis that a 
higher outcome certainty leads to a lower fan attendance. A normative analysis of central and 
decentral marketing in European team sports is offered by Falconieri et al. (2004). The 
authors determine the social welfare in both kinds of marketing and show the respective 
conditions under which each is socially optimal. In their analysis, they assume that the sports 
association will always install central marketing if it is in possession of the league`s 
broadcasting rights. On the other hand, decentral marketing will only be possible if the soccer 
clubs possess these rights. The authors do not allow for the possibility that a sports association 
possessing TV rights installs decentral marketing voluntarily. Further, they do not analyse the 
association`s preferences in detail. In contrast to their analysis, in this paper, it is assumed that 
there is a national sports association that is in possession of the league`s broadcasting rights, 
and that is allowed to choose between central or decentral marketing. In this setting, I 
determine formally what kind of marketing is optimal for the association. I will distinguish 
between three situations. In situation (i), the association is interested only in competitive 
balance, in situation (ii), it is interested in creating one high-performing team, and in situation 
(iii), it wants to maximise the aggregate performance in the league. Several results will be 
derived in this paper. If the sports association is interested only in competitive balance, it will 
always choose central marketing. In the other two cases, the association’s decision is 
influenced by three countervailing effects. Hence, its decision, whether to choose central or 
decentral marketing, is determined by which of the effects is dominant. 
The paper is organised as follows: In section 2, the model is introduced. Section 3 contains 
the solution to the model and shows up the decision of the sports association. Additionally, 
the clubs’ and players’ preferred kind of marketing is analysed. Concluding remarks are 
offered in section 4. 
 
2.  Description of the model and notation   5
In the model, there are several parties: A sports association, the boards of two clubs (in what 
follows) referred to as “the clubs”, and four players that form the two teams of the clubs. 
The sports association: There is a sports association organising a league. It can either market 
the league’s broadcasting rights centrally or allow the clubs to market decentrally. It is 
assumed that in each kind of marketing total TV revenue is the same, only its allocation 
between the two clubs differs.
7 Total TV revenue is denoted by R. It is further assumed that, 
in case of central marketing, the sports association shares some part of the revenue equally 
between the two clubs, while the other part is shared according to the teams’ previous season 
performances. In this context, we assume, without loss of generality, that the team of the first 
club has won the previous season league competition. Formally, the sports association 
determines some allocation parameter θ such that the first club receives ()2 R 1 ⋅ θ +  and the 
second ()2 R 1 ⋅ θ − .
8 If the clubs market decentrally, the revenue will be shared according to 
some rule () α − α1 , , where the first club receives  R ⋅ α  and the second one () R 1 ⋅ α − . 
Suppose that, under central marketing, there is resistance against very uneven allocation rules, 
that is, the sports association is not allowed to choose θ in an arbitrary way. Particularly, let 
the association be restricted to choose θ from an interval [ ] θ
~
, 0,  w h e r e  
{} α ⋅ − − α ⋅ < θ 2 1 , 1 2 Max
~
. The inequality means that resource allocation under decentral 
marketing is more uneven than under central marketing, which seems to map practice very 
well. Concerning the preferences of the association, it is assumed that it wishes to maximise 
the fan interest in its league.
9 However, fan interest might increase for different reasons. I 
                                                 
7 Clearly, one could think that due to different bargaining positions, an association could achieve different total 
revenue from the clubs. However, in this paper, we focus on the use of central marketing as a redistribution 
mechanism. In particular, we ask whether the association always wants to redistribute resources within the 
league it organises or not. Assuming a fixed total TV revenue helps to eliminate effects distorting this analysis. 
8 In practice, the installation of an allocation rule usually occurs before the season starts and not thereafter as 
assumed in the model. However, this is not very problematic. The model could be interpreted such that the 
association cannot influence the clubs’ budgets and so the outcome in the next season, but in the season 
following the next. Hence, it tries to maximise fan interest in that season. 
9 In each firm, it is problematic for the management when demand for the firm’s products is very low. The 
management would be made responsible for the low demand and has to fear dismissals or wage reductions.   6
therefore distinguish between three situations. In situation (i), fan interest increases in the 
level of competitive balance, so the association wishes to minimise  2 1 y y − , where  j y 
denotes the performance of team j (j=1,2). In situation (ii), fans are only interested in 
outstanding performances, the association then wishes to maximise  {} 2 1 y , y max . In the last 
case (iii), the association maximises  2 1 y y + , since fan interest is determined by the aggregate 
quality of the league. Clearly, in practice, fan interest may be determined by all of these 
arguments. Yet, I prefer to firstly analyse situations (i) to (iii) in isolation, since, in this way, 
the effects influencing the association’s decision can be made clearer. Subsequently, I shortly 
discuss what the association’s preferred kind of marketing is when it cares for all three 
arguments. 
The clubs: As mentioned before, there are two clubs. The first club is assumed to be quite 
famous, while the other is assumed to be less famous. That is, the first club is, e.g. due to 
historical successes, very popular and therefore attracts more fans than the second. Note that it 
is not important to our results that the team of the famous club has won the previous season 
league competition. Each club competes with one team in the league and so has to hire (and 
pay) two players, respectively. In this context, it is assumed that TV revenue is a club’s only 
source of income.
10 Hence, the budgets of the two clubs are ( ) 2 R 1 ⋅ θ +  and ()2 R 1 ⋅ θ −  in 
the case of central marketing. In the case of decentral marketing, club 1 has a budget of  R ⋅ α  
and club 2 of () R 1 ⋅ α − , where  2 1 > α . It is further assumed that a club is interested in 
maximising the winning probability of its team.
11 In the majority of clubs, boards do not gain 
from club profits and, hence, they do not care much about them. Moreover, if a club is very 
successful, the members of this club’s board receive utility in terms of social prestige. 
                                                                                                                                                          
Hence, the management is interested in creating a high demand for the firm’s products. Clearly, the same 
argumentation holds for the officials of an association. So they are also interested in maximising fan interest. 
10 As already mentioned, the clubs have other sources of income. Since the TV revenues are of such high 
relevance, it is assumed for simplicity that all other incomes equal zero. 
11 See, for example, Dietl et al. (2003).   7
Consequently, they wish to maximise their expected social prestige and, on account of this, 
they wish to maximise the winning-probability of their team. 
The teams: There are two teams competing against each other. Each team consists of two 
players, and each player has to handle a single task.
12 As seems natural in team sports, assume 
that the performance of a team is characterised by the existence of strong complementarities 
between the single players’ tasks, i.e., team performance will be constrained by the player 
who performs rather badly. A soccer team may have very good forwards, but if its goalkeeper 
is totally incapable, this team will not be very successful.
13 
Suppose that player i of team j chooses the effort level  ji e  as a continuous variable from the 
interval  [] k , 0 , where k is so high that the restriction  k e ji ≤  never binds in equilibrium. To 
formally introduce the complementarities between the players’ performances, it is assumed 
that the performance of team j (j=1,2) is: 
(1)  2 j 1 j j e e y ⋅ = .
14 
The two teams compete for a bonus b>0. This bonus is assumed to be exogenously given
15 
and equally distributed among the members of the winning team.
16 Moreover, as typical in 
sports economics, league competition is modelled as a logit-form contest (see, e.g., Hoehn 
and Szymanski, 1999, Szymanski, 2003 , or for the use of logit form contests in other fields of 
economics Skaperdas, 1996; Gradstein and Konrad, 1999; Huck et al. 2001). Therefore, the 
contest success function of team 1, i.e., the probability of winning, is given by 
                                                 
12 For example, each team could consist of one defender and one forward. 
13 See, for a formal analysis of complementarities in production e.g. Milgrom/Roberts (1990), (1995) or Kremer 
(1993). 
14 I admit that this is a very extreme assumption, since the function is characterised by the existence of very 
strong complementarities. However, the main effects to be derived in this paper are all qualitatively the same for 
an arbitrary, concave and supermodular function. 
15 This assumption can be justified as follows: In the European sport leagues, the players receive winning 
bonuses from their clubs. However, these bonuses are negligibly small in comparison to the players` fixed 
wages. Hence, there must be another driving force that motivates the players. On the one hand, there is career 
concern. If a team presently performs very badly, the players of this team will have problems to sign a new 
contract with a soccer team in the future, since their present performance serves as a signal for future 
performance. Secondly, a player feels proud when his team wins a match. Therefore, he gets a non monetary 
gain from belonging to the winning team. These two elements are combined to an exogenously given bonus. 
16 One could alternatively assume that the bonus possesses public-good characteristics. In this case, the bonus 
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17 
The players: In the player market, there are  4 n H ≥  high-ability players with ability  H a  and 
4 n L ≥  low-ability players with ability  L a ( ) L H a a > . For simplicity and without loss of 
generality, I normalise  L a  to 1. The players` abilities are common knowledge among all 
players as well as among the clubs and the association.
18 A high-ability player is assumed to 
have a cost advantage, hence he exerts a certain effort more easily than a low-ability player. 
In order to introduce this cost advantage formally, I assume that costs, entailed by effort, are 





ji > δ ⋅ =
δ , where  ji a  denotes the ability of player i of team j and the parameter 
restriction is introduced to ensure the existence of all equilibria to be derived. The parameter 
δ determines the degree of convexity of this cost function and, for this reason, strongly 
influences the effective cost advantage of a high-ability player. Without modelling the market 
for players in detail, it is assumed that a low-ability player accepts a contract at a lower wage 
offer than a high-ability player. Let  H w  ( L w ) denote the reservation wage that has to be paid 
for hiring a high-(low-)ability player.
19 These reservation wages indicate that there are clubs 
in other (usually foreign) leagues being interested in hiring the players. Further assume that 
( ) R 1 w w 2 R H H ⋅ α − > > ⋅ ≥ ⋅ α  and  0 w L =  hold. The meaning of the inequalities becomes 
clear in the next section. The restriction on  L w  is made to ensure that each team is always 
                                                 
17 It should be noted that this paper is naturally also related to the literature on group rent-seeking contests. See, 
for this literature, e.g., Katz, Nitzan, Rosenberg (1990), Nitzan (1991), or Lee (1995). The main difference 
between these papers and the current one is that team performance in sports is usually characterised by the 
existence of strong complementarities between the single players’ performances. In contrast, the contributions of 
the participants in a group contest are usually not complementary. 
18 One could imagine that the players have played in the soccer league for a considerable period. As a 
consequence, their previous performances could be used as a good measure of their quality. 
19 In proposition 5, it is shown that the players have an interest to self-select into teams in order to maximise the 
probability of receiving the bonus. It is in this context assumed that the bonus is relatively small in comparison 
to the reservation wages so that it cannot be used to hire high-ability players.   9
able to hire low-ability players. Lastly, all players are assumed to be risk-neutral. Hence, after 
being hired, player i of team j chooses his effort  ji e  to maximise  () ji j ji e C
2
b
P EU − ⋅ = . 
 
The timing of the model is as follows: In the first stage, the association chooses whether to 
market centrally or decentrally. In case of central marketing, it also determines the allocation 
rule. In the second stage, the two clubs hire players for their teams, respectively. In the third 
stage, the players choose their optimal efforts. 
 
3.  Solution to the model 
Efforts and player allocation to the teams: 
As described in section 2, in the third stage of the model, player i of team j chooses his effort 
to maximise  () ji j ji e C
2
b
P EU − ⋅ = . Inserting the winning probability of team j according to 
equation (2) and the cost function  ( ) ji e C  yields the subsequent maximisation problem: 
(3) 
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∂ − δ .
20 
The second-order condition is satisfied. The optimal players` efforts depend on the 
composition of the two teams. Since the clubs decide about which players to hire and, hence, 
about the team composition, I now turn to stage 2 of the model. 
By hiring appropriate players, a club wants to maximise its team’s winning-probability. For 
each kind of feasible team composition, one can use the first-order conditions to derive the 
                                                 
20 We consider the Nash-equilibrium, where each player exerts positive effort. However, there exists a second 
trivial Nash-equilibrium, where each player exerts zero effort.    10
players’ efforts and, from these, the teams’ winning-probabilities. The winning-probabilities 
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From Figure 1, it is straightforward to derive the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1:  
(a) Each club wishes to hire as many high-ability players as possible. 
(b) Club 1 (club 2) weakly  prefers decentral (central)  marketing.  
 
The intuition behind proposition 1 is obvious. Each club wishes to engage high-ability players 
in order to strengthen its team’s quality. Therefore, decentral marketing leads to team 
                                                 
21 H,H means that a club hires two high-ability players. Similarly, H,L means that a club hires one high and one 
low-ability player, while L,L denotes the club’s decision to hire two low-ability players. 
H,L L,L 
Club 2 





H,H   11
formation  () () {} L L H H a , a , a , a , i.e., the first team consists of two high and the second of two 
low-ability players. This is the best outcome for the famous club and the worst outcome for 
the less famous club. So, the famous club prefers to market decentrally and, hence, to receive 
more TV revenue than the less famous club, while the less famous club naturally prefers a 
more egalitarian distribution rule for TV revenue. As described in the introduction, this is 
exactly what we observe in practice. Small (or less famous) clubs are highly interested in 
marketing centrally, while bigger clubs lobby for a decentral allocation rule. 
 
Determination of marketing: 
Let us now turn to stage 1 of the model. The sports association can influence the player 
allocation to the two teams in two ways, by determining the kind of marketing and, when 
choosing central marketing, by determining the parameter θ. In order to see what kind of 
marketing the association prefers, situations (i) to (iii) have to be analysed separately. 
Consider first situation (i): 
 
•  Situation (i): 
Situation (i) is rather trivial. Here, the association is assumed to only be interested in 
competitive balance. In this case, the following proposition holds: 
 
Proposition 2: If the association is interested only in competitive balance, it will always 
market centrally. 
 
An association solely interested in competitive balance wishes to create two equally strong 
teams. Under central marketing, the association can perfectly achieve this aim by choosing 
0 = θ , i.e., by equally sharing the TV revenue. On the other hand, under decentral marketing, 
the first team is stronger than the second one. Hence, if fan interest is only determined by the 
closeness and not by the quality of competition, the association will always be interested in 
distributing TV revenue equally in order to create competitive balance.   12
 
•  Situation (ii): 
In situation (ii), the decision of the association becomes more complex. In this case, the 
association wishes to create an extremely high-performing team. One might therefore think 
that the association allows decentral marketing in order to give the more famous club the 
possibility to increase its team’s quality. However, this is not necessarily true as the following 
proposition shows. 
 
Proposition 3: Let the association be interested in creating a very high-performing team. 
(a) For  H w 3 R ⋅ ≥  and  H w 2 R
~
⋅ ≥ ⋅ θ , the association will always market centrally. 
(b) For  H w 3 R ⋅ <  and  H w 2 R
~
⋅ ≥ ⋅ θ , central marketing is (weakly) preferred.  
(c) For  H w 2 R
~
⋅ < ⋅ θ , there exists a cut-off value  1
~
> δ  so that the following holds: 
(i)  For  δ δ
~
> , the association always prefers decentral to central marketing. 
(ii) For  δ δ
~
< , there exists a value  1 a ~
H >  such that the association installs decentral 
marketing if and only if  H H a ~ a < . 
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
If the association is interested in creating a very high-performing team, both kinds of 
marketing will be optimal for some parameter constellations. Let me explain this result in 
more detail. There exist three countervailing effects influencing the association’s decision. On 
the one hand, there is a quality effect. For a given kind of team composition, a high-ability 
player always exerts a higher effort than a low-ability player. Hence, the association is 
interested in creating a team consisting of two high-ability players. Secondly, there is a 
complementarity effect. The complementarities in team performance (i.e.  0
e e
y






it desirable for the association to collocate two players in a team exerting identical effort. This   13
can easily be demonstrated by an example: Using production function (1), a team with two 
players both exerting effort 0.5, is more successful than a team with one player exerting effort 
0.6 and the other player exerting 0.4, even if aggregate effort equals 1 in both cases. Since in a 
homogeneous team the high-ability players always choose identical effort and the low-ability 
players also exert (lower) identical effort, the association wishes to place two equal able 
players in one team. Thirdly, there is also a competition effect. If homogeneity between the 
teams increases, i.e., if competition between the teams becomes more significant, the players’ 
efforts will also increase. 
With  H w 3 R ⋅ ≥  and  H w 2 R
~
⋅ ≥ ⋅ θ , central marketing allows the association to allocate TV 
revenue such that the first team consists of two high-ability players and the second of at least 
one. In this case, the quality effect and the complementarity effect are the same under central 
and decentral marketing. However, competition is more intense under central marketing so 
that it is preferred. For  H w 3 R ⋅ <  and  H w 2 R
~
⋅ ≥ ⋅ θ , central marketing can always replicate 
the outcome of decentral marketing. Moreover, it can achieve a different player allocation to 
the teams that is sometimes preferred. It is therefore (weakly) optimal. 
The association’s decision becomes more complex, when  H w 2 R
~
⋅ < ⋅ θ  holds. In this case, 
central marketing will inevitable lead to two teams consisting of one high and one low-ability 
player. It is then necessary to better understand the single effects. The competition effect is 
very important when δ  is small and  H a  large. This is very intuitive. In case of a large δ , 
effort is extremely costly for the players. Hence, the players exert very low effort in both 
kinds of team composition. If δ  becomes small, the players will increase their efforts. This 
increase in effort significantly depends on the degree of the high-ability players’ cost 
advantage and the chosen kind of marketing. If marketing is decentral and, hence, the teams 
differ, the effort will only increase significantly in the case of a small  H a . Otherwise, the low-
ability players are discouraged, since they have almost no chance of winning the tournament,   14
and, therefore, reduce their efforts in order to save on costs. As a consequence, the high-
ability players also reduce their efforts.
22 However, in the case of central marketing, an 
increase in  H a  does not serve to discourage, since both teams are affected by the ability 
change in the same way. 
By understanding this competition effect, the results in proposition 3(c) become more 
plausible. In case of a large δ , the competition effect is negligible. On account of this, the 
association installs decentral marketing, since the disadvantage of this kind of marketing is 
low. If δ  is quite small, the competition effect becomes more important. In this case, the 
association’s decision depends on the cost parameter,  H a . If  H a  becomes higher, the ability 
difference between the high and low-ability players increases. As a result, both, the quality 
effect and the complementarity effect become more relevant. However, the relevance of the 
competition effect rises disproportionately in  H a , and the association installs central 
marketing. 
 
•  Situation (iii): 
In this situation, the association is interested in maximising aggregate performance in the 
league. Its choice of marketing is described in proposition 4: 
 
Proposition 4: Let the association be interested in maximising aggregate performance in the 
league. Then, 
(a) For  H w 3 R ⋅ ≥  and  H w 2 R
~
⋅ ≥ ⋅ θ , the association will always market centrally. 
(b) For  H w 3 R ⋅ <  and  H w 2 R
~
⋅ ≥ ⋅ θ , central marketing is (weakly) preferred. 
                                                 
22 This behaviour of players has been observed in soccer many times. Consider a match between two 
heterogeneous teams, one favourite team and one “weak” team. When the favourite team scores very early in the 
match, often the following can be observed: the players of the weak team no longer believe that they can win the 
match and, for this reason, they reduce their efforts. Then, the members of the favourite team also reduce their 
efforts and just play to defend their advantage. As a consequence, the spectators neither see a top performance 
from the favourite team, nor from the weak team.   15
(c) For  H w 2 R
~
⋅ < ⋅ θ , there exists a cut-off value  4 ˆ = δ  such that the association installs 
central marketing if and only if  δ δ ˆ < . 
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
If the association wishes to maximise aggregate performance in the league, the three 
mentioned effects will again be present. In case (a) of proposition 4, central marketing allows 
the association to increase the strength of the second team relative to the decentral marketing 
outcome without decreasing the first team’s strength. Hence, the competition effect and the 
quality effect make central marketing preferable. They dominate the complementarity effect 
that is optimally used under decentral marketing. In case (b), central marketing is able to 
replicate the decentral marketing outcome, but also to achieve a different outcome that is 
preferred for some parameter constellations. It is therefore (weakly) dominant. In case (c), the 
quality effect falls away. If the quality of team 1 is increased by installing decentral 
marketing, the quality of team 2 is automatically decreased and vice versa. Therefore, the 
association’s trade-off is affected only by the competition effect and the complementarity 
effect. As stated in proposition 3, the competition effect dominates the complementarity effect 
only if δ  lies below the cut-off  4 ˆ = δ . This is intuitive. The competition effect will be 
significant and, therefore, dominant if δ  is low. For a high δ , competition only induces a low 
increase in aggregate effort, and the complementarity effect dominates. 
 
In practice, fan interest is usually determined by all the criteria depicted in situations (i) to 
(iii). There are fans that are mainly interested in intense competition with uncertain outcome, 
whereas other fans are more interested in high absolute performance. Hence, the objective 
function of the association usually is a combination of the three handled criteria. What does 
this mean for the optimal choice of marketing? Clearly, when  H w 3 R ⋅ ≥  and  H w 2 R
~
⋅ ≥ ⋅ θ ,   16
central marketing is always optimal since it entails higher absolute performance as well as 
higher competitive balance. Note that these restrictions mean that the allocation of TV 
revenue under decentral marketing is extremely unjust. Central marketing is then able to 
redistribute TV revenue such that the aggregate number of high-ability players in the league 
increases. On the other hand, for  H w 2 R
~
⋅ < ⋅ θ , decentral marketing might be optimal. In case 
of a large δ , decentral marketing is optimal from the viewpoint of absolute performance, 
while central marketing creates competitive balance. The association’s decision then depends 
on the weights of the single criteria in its objective function.  
 
Player preferences with respect to the two types of marketing: 
Up to this point, the clubs’ and the association’s preferred kind of marketing has been 
analysed. In order to complete the analysis we need to consider the players` preferences 
concerning central and decentral marketing. This is done in proposition 5. 
 
Proposition 5: If a high-ability player is hired under both kinds of marketing, he will prefer 
decentral marketing.  If a low-ability player is hired under both kinds of marketing, he will 
prefer central marketing.  
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
Although at first sight not very surprising, this result is not as easily understood as it may 
seem. A change in team composition has two effects on the players’ utilities. On the one hand, 
competition between the teams might change. Therefore, the players’ efforts and, hence, the 
costs of effort, are affected, too. On the other hand, there might be an alteration in the teams’ 
winning probabilities. For a high-ability player, both effects work in the same direction, that 
is, he is most likely to win competition and he exerts lowest effort under decentral marketing. 
Hence, a decentral allocation rule for TV revenue is optimal for him.   17
For a low-ability player, the two effects are countervailing.
23 If he is in a team with a high 
instead of a low-ability player, competition between the two teams will be intensified, and so 
the player suffers from higher effort costs. On the other hand, he will be more likely to win 
the bonus. For  1 > δ , the second effect always dominates the first one, so that a low-ability 
player prefers to be in a team with a high-ability player. 
However, if the restriction  1 > δ  were cancelled, there are parameter constellations such that a 
low-ability player would wish to be in a team with another low-ability player. The reason is 
that for a rather small δ  even the low-ability players choose high efforts. As a consequence, 
the winning probabilities in both cases do not differ significantly, and the first effect will be 
dominant. Since only  1 > δ  guarantees the existence of an equilibrium, proposition 5 does not 
consider the possibility that a low-ability player might prefer decentral marketing. 
Lastly, the players achieve a rent from taking part in the league. Hence they prefer belonging 
to a team over not being hired at all, no matter what the player allocation to the two teams 
looks like. 
 
Scarcity of high-ability players: 
In the previous analysis, nothing has been said about the scarcity of high-ability players. The 
high-ability player reservation wage  H w  could be interpreted as a measure of scarcity. If 
there exist only a few high-ability players in the market,  H w  will be rather large, whereas it 
should be very small in case of many high-ability players. A small  H w  implies that TV 
revenue allocation under decentral marketing is very unjust. It is then very likely that central 
marketing is installed. However, one could think that  H w  would become so low that 
() R 1 w H ⋅ α − >  did not hold anymore. Decentral marketing could then also be optimal. 
Moreover, it might also be optimal if high-ability players are rare in the market and their 
reservation wages are high. 
                                                 
23 Note that both teams will never consist of two low-ability players.    18
 
 
4.  Concluding remarks 
The aim of this paper was to analyse under which conditions a national sports association will 
install central marketing and in which situations it will allow decentral marketing since both 
distribution rules can be observed in practice. It was found that a sports association that is 
only interested in competitive balance will always market centrally. In contrast, a sports 
association that is interested in one extremely high-performing team or that wishes to 
maximise the aggregate performance in the league for some parameter constellations chooses 
central marketing, while for others it chooses decentral marketing. 
Usually, a sports association cares for both, intense competition between the clubs and high 
absolute performance. Central marketing is then always preferred when TV revenue 
allocation under decentral marketing is extremely unjust. Under central marketing, revenue 
could be redistributed such that the aggregate number of high-ability players in the league 
increases. In this case, competition becomes more intense and absolute performance gets 
higher. On the other hand, decentral marketing might be optimal, if the creation of a very 
strong team is desired that cannot be reached under central marketing. 
Moreover, it was shown that we have extreme conflicts of interest between the more and less 
famous clubs and the more and less able players. The “weak” parties, i.e., the small clubs and 
less able players, always prefer central marketing, while the big clubs and more able players 
wish to exploit their superior position by means of decentral marketing. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that the model naturally represents only a partial analysis of 
the market for broadcasting rights in professional soccer. Due to its complexity, not all market 
aspects could be treated in the model. However, in addition to its special application to 
professional soccer, the model could also be seen as a contribution to the literature on group 
rent-seeking contests.  
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Proof of proposition 3: 
Note that under decentral marketing the first team consists of two high and the second of two 
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maximum is 
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1 y . Think that  H w 4 R ⋅ ≥ . In this case, the sports association can install central 
marketing and allocate resources such that both teams consist of two high-ability players. The 
two teams’ performances are then  () δ δ ⋅ ⋅ = =
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H 2 1 8 a b y y . The inequality 
dec
1 1 y y >  
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H a 2 a 1 a 2 a 1 2 , which, using the second 
binomial, can be shown to be satisfied. 
Now assume that  H H w 3 R w 4 ⋅ ≥ > ⋅  and  H w 2 R
~
⋅ ≥ ⋅ θ . The association is then able to 
install central marketing and distribute revenue such that the first team consists of two high-
ability players and the second of one low and one high-ability player. The two teams’ 
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δ δ δ δ . The function  ( )
x K x E =  is, for K>1, 
strictly increasing and convex. Hence, the difference 
5 . 1 2 K K −  is bigger than 
0 5 . 0 K K − , so 
that the above inequality holds.   20
Suppose now that  H w 3 R ⋅ <  and  H w 2 R
~
⋅ ≥ ⋅ θ  hold. Under central marketing, the 
association is able to achieve - inter alia - the two following team compositions. The first is 
the same as under decentral marketing. In the second, each team consists of one high and one 
low-ability player. Since the second kind of team composition is sometimes preferred, as will 
be shown next, central marketing is weakly dominant. 
Now assume that  H w 2 R
~
⋅ < ⋅ θ . Under central marketing revenue can be allocated such that 
each team consists of one high and one low-ability player. The two teams’ performances are 
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This derivative is positive if and only if the following condition holds: 
























Since  () 0 a , F lim H > δ
∞ → δ  holds,  () H a , F δ  will always exceed zero if the condition 
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inequality can be transformed as follows:  () ( ) 3
4
H H e 25 . 1 a a ln 75 . 0 25 . 1 ln ⋅ < ⇔ ⋅ > . 
Summarising, we see that for large δ , the condition  2 1
dec
1 y ˆ y ˆ y = >  always holds. For small 
δ , the condition  2 1
dec
1 y ˆ y ˆ y = >  only holds if  H a  is sufficiently small.   21
Finally, it has to be shown that the association never prefers to have one high and one low-
ability player in the first team and two low-ability players in the second. The two teams’ 











































H 2 a 1 2 b a y ( . We prove this by showing that  1 1 y y ˆ ( >  always holds. 
This inequality can be simplified to  () () () () δ ⋅ δ δ
δ
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H a 2 a 1 a 2 a 1 2 . 
Using the second binomial, one can show that the last condition is always satisfied. 
 
Proof of proposition 4: 
Note first that  1 1 y ˆ 2 y 2 ⋅ > ⋅ . Because of part (c) of this proposition, one therefore only needs 
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holds. For  4 ≥ δ , the term () ( ) 4 4 2 − δ − δ ⋅  is always bigger than 2 so that the last condition 
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H a 1 − δ ⋅ δ < . For  4 > δ , this condition is fulfilled. Assume now that  4 < δ  holds. We then 
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δ δ δ . As seen in the proof of proposition 3,   22











− . Rearranging yields  δ ≤ 0 , for  4 < δ , which is 
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1 1 y y y ˆ 2 + < > ⋅  holds only if  ( )4 > < δ . 
Lastly, it has to be shown that it is never optimal for the association to allocate resources such 
that the first team consists of one high and one low-ability player and the second of two low-
ability players. To prove this, we show that  2 1 1 y y y ˆ 2 ( ( + > ⋅  always holds. This condition 



















a 1 a 2 2 . For  4 = δ , this inequality surely holds. Consider 
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H a a , this condition holds. Suppose now that  δ > 4 . In this case, it has to be 












H a a 
or equivalently, () ()1 a 4
5 . 0
H < − δ
δ ⋅
, which is fulfilled for  δ > 4 . 
 
Proof of proposition 5: 
From Figure 1 we know that a high-ability player’s winning probability is highest under 
decentral marketing. It is therefore sufficient to show that his effort, and hence his effort 

























H a 1 2 b a e . In the possible cases under central marketing his   23
effort is  () δ δ ⋅ ⋅ =
1























H H a 1 2 b a e ~  (the first team consists of two high-ability players and 
the second of one low and one high-ability player) and  () δ δ ⋅ ⋅ =
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H H 8 b a e ˆ  (each team consists 
of one high and one low-ability player). The condition  H H
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H a 1 a 1 a 2 . As shown in the proof 
of proposition 3, this condition always holds. 
 
A low-ability player may be hired under central marketing in two cases, in the case where 
both teams consist of one high and one low-ability player (and where his effort and his 
expected utility are  () δ δ ⋅ =
1
L 8 b e ˆ   and  L U ˆ E ) and in the case where the first team consists of 
two high-ability players and the second of one high and one low-ability player. The low-
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utility  L U
~
E.  L e t  
dec
L EU  denote the low-ability player’s expected utility under decentral 
marketing. The condition 
dec















































Simplifying this condition leads to: 
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H δ δ ⋅ − + δ ⋅ > ⋅ − δ ⋅ ⇔  
For  1 > δ , the right-hand side of the last inequality is always smaller than  1 2 − δ ⋅ . Therefore, 
the inequality is always fulfilled for  1 > δ . 
The condition 
dec
L L EU U
~



















































































some calculations, this condition simplifies to  () () ()
() 1 a















side of this condition is always smaller than 1. So, the condition is always satisfied for  1 > δ . 
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